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Abstract—Next generation networks are designed to improve
connectivity and capacity, adding to the current range of available
services and expanding their reachability. For these systems to
work, they need to be compatible with legacy technologies in
addition to making use of (limited) available spectrum resources.
This is one of the reasons why spectrum sharing has been at the
forefront of the list of enablers for such systems. From federal-
commercial sharing to finding opportunities in millimeter-wave
spectrum, we have witnessed the formulation of multiple ap-
proaches to making spectrum sharing happen.
Existing work on spectrum sharing is wide ranging and
includes technical as well as market-based approaches. The
study of spectrum markets is of particular interest, as it merges
a market approach with the technical limitations inherent to
electromagnetic spectrum. In this manner, spectrum markets
settings have called for different definitions of spectrum-related
resources as a means to increase market thickness and thus
improve the opportunities for market success. In a similar vein,
we find proposals of network models which aim at adapting
technical definitions of spectrum resources, such as those that
are the product of virtualization. In this work, we adopt a
market perspective for spectrum sharing within the context of
more comprehensive network definitions such as those envisioned
for next generation networks. To this end, we explore matching
market concepts and middleman theory in order to shed light
on factors that may impact the performance and, ultimately, the
success of spectrum markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many solutions have been developed to promote efficiency
in the utilization of spectrum resources. Technical approaches
deal with the complexity of defining spectrum due to its
multidimensionality [1] and variability. At the same time,
market approaches for the assignment of spectrum, mainly
pointing to the utilization of auctions, grow in complexity as
we attempt to provide a spectrum marketplace where buyers
can place expressive bids.
In past work, we have focused on the study of what renders
secondary spectrum markets viable [2], [3]. Particularly, in
[3], we point out that homogeneous commodities are key
for adding thickness to the market, and hence improving the
conditions that lead to viable market scenarios. In that work,
homogeneous commodities are defined by taking into account
virtualization and LTE-A characteristics.
As a means to further spectrum markets research, we
find it important to explore them within a network context
that may resemble that of next-generation networks. To this
end, we build upon the network definition presented in [4]
and, utilizing Agent-based Modeling, we study the possible
behavior of agents and the factors leading to the development
of viable spectrum markets.
The objective of this work is to study a network where
virtualized spectrum resources can be traded. In this way, we
detach ourselves from a standalone market analysis, and look
at the broader context in which markets may operate. This calls
for exploring economics factors that drive agents’ participation
in the market, how the existing demand can be managed and
how this may point to the final profit obtained from market
transactions. In this paper, we explore the general definition of
such a network and we describe the interactions that take place
among the market participants in order to define the market
demand. We utilize matching markets concepts and middleman
theory in order to delve into demand-generating interactions.
We consider this step to be crucial towards dealing with market
congestion and providing better spectrum access opportunities.
This paper is organized as follows: section II provides a
detailed description of the model that we have developed for
this study; section III presents the factors taken into account
for our experiment design; section IV presents the results
obtained through agent-based model simulations; section V
elaborates on the implications of our model and results, and
in section VI we present our concluding remarks and future
work.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
One of the main objectives of this work is to analyze
markets as entities that operate within a communications net-
work, instead of looking at them as standalone institutions. For
this purpose, we work with a model definition that accounts
for multiple market participants, and which provides us with
enough flexibility to adapt to network scenarios of interest.
A. General Model Overview
The particular network model we build upon is that in-
troduced by Doyle et al. in [4]. This framework envisions
heterogeneous physical networks that collaborate through vir-
tualization to provide a consistent service to end users. Such an
approach suggests three main participating entities: Resource
Providers, Virtual Network Builders and Service Providers.
• Resource providers (RPs) are current resource owners
who may be interested in making their resources available
for resale in the market.
• Service providers (SPs) are new market entrants, or
existing providers, who require additional resources to
fulfill the demand of their own end users.
• Virtual Network Builders (VNBs) act as a brokers or
middlemen. As such, they are in charge of aggregating
resources from the pool and assigning them to the SPs
who are requesting them.
Figure 1 illustrates the workings of this model. As shown,
this model considers two important parts: (1) defining and
generating the market demand, and (2) fulfilling that demand,
using pooled resources. In this work, we address the first
part of this model. We envision this process as a partnership
forming stage between SPs and VNBs, akin to customer –
broker (i.e., middleman) relationships that we form in real
life. Indeed, inspired by real-life examples, we delve into what
drives these relationships and extrapolate these characteristics
to a spectrum market scenario.
The characteristics of VNBs as middlemen are detailed
in subsection II-B and the specifics of the model we have
developed are presented in subsection II-C
B. Virtual Network Builders as Middlemen
One of the tasks assigned to VNBs in our model is that
of analyzing the resources available in the common resource
pool. Heterogeneous pooled resources may cause this task
to be significantly complex, as VNBs need to aggregate
resources in a manner that satisfies the requirements of their
SP customers.
As complex as the resource aggregation task may be, it is
not the only aspect associated with the functions of middlemen
in our model. In [5], the author provides a thorough analysis
of the different tasks that middlemen fulfill and divides them
into six categories. In what follows, we explore the categories
that apply to the workings of the VNBs in our network model.
• Bridge: Reduces the “physical, social, or temporal dis-
tance” between buyers and sellers. In this way, this type
of middleman is able to find opportunities between two
disconnected sets of participants.
• Insulator: Limits the information flow between buyers
and sellers, or in this particular case between RPs and
SPs.
• Certifier: Provides value for both, buyers and sellers, by
screening available options, scouting for the requirements
of buyers and endorsing its findings through their own
reputation. In this manner, the middleman reduces the
asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers.
• Enforcer: Makes sure that the buyers and sellers (i.e.,
RPs and SPs) are not failing to provide the service or
utilize the resources as convened.
• Risk bearer: Reduces uncertainty for both negotiating
parties. In fact, “[b]y building diversified portfolios,
[these middlemen] are better able to weather volatility
than their trading partners”[5].
Additionally, in the particular case of resource access,
middlemen can minimize the intellectual barriers posed by the
knowledge required in order to successfully obtain resources
from an auction. This includes appropriately expressing re-
source needs, and remaining updated on how to remain com-
petitive in an auction.
C. Defining and Generating Market Demand via Matching
As previously mentioned, the first stage of our model
consists of developing a mechanism that defines and generates
the market demand. To this end, we need to consider a portion
of the existing, geographical demand and convert it into the
demand that will be satisfied using pooled resources. To this
end, we consider a partnership-forming process between VNBs
and SPs. In what follows, we delve into the details behind this
matching process 1.
Let S = {s1, s2, ...sn} be the set of n participating SPs
and B = {b1, b2, ...bm} the set of m participating VNBs. Each
of the agents in S and B are assigned a risk profile, which
guides the values they assign to their own parameters and the
preferences they express with regards to the members of the
other set. For this purpose, we assign to all s ∈ S and all
b ∈ B, a risk value defined as rv = U(0, 2). In this way, the
variable rv takes a uniformly distributed integer in the range
[0,2]. Consequently, the risk profile of si and bj is assigned
as follows:
riskProfile(rv) =

averse if rv = 0
neutral if rv = 1
taker if rv = 2
(1)
1) Configure real and advertised SPs’ and VNBs’ fees:
Each SP and VNB have real values of their willingness to
pay for a service and the minimum fee required to operate,
respectively. Nevertheless, these real values do not necessarily
match the fees and values they advertise in the market. In
this subsection, we present how these parameters have been
defined in our model.
a) Service Providers: Each SP has a real and an adver-
tised value regarding their willingness to pay for the service
of a VNB. The real valuation of an SP can be translated into
a measure of how interested is an SP in transacting with a
VNB. To capture this, we assign a level of valuation for each
SP in the system, which is a uniformly distributed integer in
the range [0,2].
vli = U(0, 2) ∀i ∈ S
In this way, the valuation level of si is finally assigned as
follows:
valuationLevel(vli) =

low if vli = 0
medium if vli = 1
high if vli = 2
(2)
1To maintain the tractability of the model, we utilize a uniform distribution
for assigning parameter levels (e.g., risk, valuation, shading) and values (e.g,
price assigned, demand levels) associated with the SPs’ and VNBs’ activities.
Resource Providers Resource Pool Virtual Network 
Builders
Service Providers End UsersEnd Users
Current Resource 
providers  demand
x Minimum acceptable 
price
x Resource characteristics 
and availability
x Minimum acceptable 
price
x Resource characteristics 
and availability
x Service-specific demand
x Maximum willingness to 
pay
Current Service Providers  
demand
1
x Compensation
x Resource use status
Seeks resources that match:
x Customer-oriented 
demand
x Max. willingness to pay
x Customer-specific offer
x Price to pay for resources
x Provide specialized 
services
x Fulfill end-users demand
2 3
Fig. 1. General Network Interactions
We assume that there is a minimum price (reserve price)
advertised in the system for the revenue expected by a VNB
and also a maximum, known, price that any VNB can charge.
In this way, we work with a range of prices that will be chosen
by si according to its valuation level vli. These fee thresholds
are included in Table I.
Valuation Level
(vli)
Real Fee Range
0 pi = U(pmin, pmed)
1 pi = U(pmed, ph)
2 pi = U(ph, pmax)
TABLE I
VNB FEE RANGE ACCORDING TO SPS’ VALUATION LEVEL
The limits utilized for the different fee levels are the
following:
pmin = 25 (3)
pmax = 100 (4)
pmed =
pmax + 2× pmin
3
(5)
ph =
2× pmax + pmin
3
(6)
The fee advertised by each SP, on the other hand, depends
on its risk profile. As such, these prices include a level of
shading, which is consistent with the risk a given SP is willing
to take. Table II shows the three levels of price shading that
have been defined.
Risk Level Price Shading
Taker dr = dA = U(0.10, 0.15)
Neutral dr = dN = U(0.05, 0.10)
Averse dr = dP = U(0, 0.05)
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF PRICE SHADING ACCORDING TO EACH SP’S RISK LEVEL
We assume that a risk averse SP is interested in maximizing
its chances of matching; hence, its shading level is low.
Taking into account the price shading levels, dr, in Table
II, the advertised prices are defined according to (7). This
definition applies to all i ∈ S.
advPricei = (1− dr)× pi (7)
.
To translate all the valuation and fees information into
preference sets, we have mapped the fees advertised by SPs
to specific price levels. These levels are defined according to
the ranges included in Table III.
Price Level Price Advertised
0 pmed > advPricei ≥ pmin
1 ph > advPricei ≥ pmed
2 pmax > advPricei ≥ ph
TABLE III
PRICE LEVELS ASSIGNED ACCORDING TO RANGE OF PRICES ADVERTISED
BY si
b) Virtual Network Builders: Similarly to SPs, each VNB
also defines real and advertised fees. In this case, fees refer
to the minimum payment that a VNB requires to fulfill its
services.
The real fee a VNB can charge is limited by its quality or
reputation. To bootstrap the market, the quality level of bj ,
qlj , is randomly assigned following (8)2.
qlj = U(0, 2) (8)
In this way, the final quality, qj , of bj stems from its own
quality level, as expressed by (9). In consequence, we expect
a higher quality VNB to charge higher fees for its services.
2We expect to incorporate a reputation building mechanism based on the
performance history of bj in future versions of this work.
Quality Level Real fee of bj
0 fj = U(fmin, fmed)
1 fj = U(fmed, fh)
2 fj = U(fh, fmax)
TABLE IV
REAL FEE OF A VNB ACCORDING TO ITS QUALITY (OR REPUTATION)
LEVEL
The actual fee assigned by each VNB falls within the range
specified in Table IV for each quality level.
qj(qlj) =

low if qlj = 0
medium if qlj = 1
high if qlj = 2
(9)
The limits utilized for the fee ranges included in Table IV
are defined as follows:
fmin = 25 (10)
fmax = 100 (11)
fmed =
fmax + 2× fmin
3
(12)
fh =
2× fmax + fmin
3
(13)
VNBs’ advertised fees result from different levels of fee
shading, which are consistent with the risk level of each VNB.
In this way, the advertised fees include a percentage increase
on a VNB’s real fee. The range for this percentage increase
is presented in Table V.
Risk Level % of Fee Increase
Taker ir = iA = U(0.10, 0.15)
Neutral ir = iN = U(0.05, 0.10)
Averse ir = iP = U(0, 0.05)
TABLE V
PERCENTAGE OF FEE INCREASE ACCORDING TO EACH VNB’S RISK
PROFILE
As shown in Table V, we assume that risk averse VNBs’
shading level is low, as substantial price increases may reduce
their matching opportunities. The final fee advertised by bj ,
advFeej , is given by (14). Each VNB is then assigned a fee
level depending on the range in which its advertised fee falls.
The fee levels and their corresponding ranges are included in
Table VI.
advFeej = (1 + ir)× fj (14)
Fee Level Fee Advertised
0 fmed > advFeej ≥ fmin
1 fh > advFeej ≥ fmed
2 fmax > advFeej ≥ fh
TABLE VI
VNBS’ FEE LEVEL ACCORDING TO THE RANGE OF THE ADVERTISED FEES
2) Service Providers’ Demand or Geographical Demand:
Considering there are o end users in the network, each one
of them is randomly set as a customer of one of the existing
SPs. For this purpose, each end user is assigned a uniformly
distributed random integer between 1 and the number of SPs.
This number corresponds to the ID of the SP that will be
serving this particular end user. In consequence, the traffic that
each SP needs to serve will be the aggregate of the demand
of its p end users. This is defined by (15), where tij is the
traffic of end user uip, and uij is the j-th user of si.
Ti =
p∑
j=1
tij (15)
The actual traffic of each end user is defined as an expo-
nentially distributed random number with mean tm. In current
tests of the model, we use the value tm = 4.0Mbps
The geographical demand accounts for all the traffic that
SPs are not able to cover with the resources they currently
own. Indeed, it results from comparing an SPs’ coverable
traffic to its traffic to serve. The coverable traffic of si, Tci, is
defined in (16), where rsci is the amount of resources already
available to si and C is the capacity per resource.
Tci = rsci × C (16)
If the coverable traffic, Tci, is greater than the traffic to
serve, the demand of si is zero. Otherwise, the geographical
resource demand of si is given by (17) and the geographical
throughput demand of si is given by (18).
di =
dTi − Tcie
C
(17)
di = dTi − Tcie (18)
To adapt this values to the final preference vector, we have
also classified the SPs’ geographical demand into three levels.
These levels are defined by expressions (19 – 22). Note that
the maximum total demand or dmax refers to the case where
an SP serves all the end users in the area, i.e., o end users, and
each end user has a traffic demand equal to the average tm.
Table VII further illustrates how the demand of si is classified
into multiple levels.
dmin = 0 (19)
dmax = o× tm (20)
dmed =
dmax + 2× dmin
3
(21)
dh =
2× dmax + dmin
3
(22)
3) Choices and Preferences of VNBs and SPs: This model
considers a set of choices and preferences for si and bj , for
all i ∈ S and j ∈ B, respectively. In what follows, I refer to
how the values for these parameters have been assigned and
how they account toward defining the final preference vectors
of SPs and VNBs.
Demand Level Demand Range
0 0 ≤ di < dmed
1 dmed ≤ di < dh
2 dh ≤ di < dmax
TABLE VII
SPS’ DEMAND LEVELS ACCORDING TO THE RANGE OF THEIR DEMAND
VALUE
a) Choices of SPs: Choice parameters are associated
with the activities of SPs and their operational requirements.
Indeed, choices reflect the values that SPs choose to advertise
based on their risk profile and valuation levels. In this way,
SPs express their choices in terms of:
• Price: defined according to the advertised price levels
presented in Table III.
• Demand: defined according to the demand levels in-
cluded in Table VII.
These parameters take integer values between 0 and 2,
which stand for low, medium and high levels, respectively.
In order to manage these parameters, we have represented the
value level associated with each parameter as a 1 × 3 vector
where the kth element can take a value of 0 or 1, depending
on whether the value corresponds to a low, medium or high
level (23). These vectors are pvi and dvi for price value and
demand value, respectively.
level vector = [L,M,H] (23)
low level = level0 = [1, 0, 0] (24)
medium level = level1 = [0, 1, 0] (25)
high level = level2 = [0, 0, 1] (26)
b) Choices of VNBs: In a similar manner to the case
of the SPs, the following parameters have been considered as
relevant for the matching process between VNBs and SPs:
• Quality: As previously presented, the quality level or
reputation is randomly assigned to each VNB in the
initialization process.
• Fees: The fee level of each VNB is defined according to
Table VI.
These parameters take integer values between 0 and 2,
which stand for low, medium and high thresholds. These levels
are also expressed as vectors, qvj and fvj for quality and fees,
respectively (23).
c) Preferences of SPs: SPs express their preferences
regarding the choices advertised by the VNBs. In this way,
for our matching model, we consider the following VNB
parameters:
• VNB reputation or quality
• VNB advertised fee
These preferences are expressed as vectors, which represent
the preference for a low, medium or high value for each
of the aforementioned parameters. Further, these preferences
are linked to the risk profile of each SP, which justifies the
preference level. In this manner, each preference vector, qpi
or ppi, is a 1 × 3 vector, where the kth element is a binary
value. The kth element is equal to 1 if si prefers that value
level for a particular parameter. This is further illustrated in
Table VIII.
Risk level of si
Reputation/Quality Preference
of si
Price Preference
of si
Averse qpi = [0, 0, 1] ppi = [0, 0, 1]
Neutral qpi = [0, 1, 1] ppi = [0, 1, 1]
Taker qpi = [1, 1, 1] ppi = [1, 1, 1]
TABLE VIII
SP PREFERENCE VECTORS ACCORDING TO RISK LEVEL
d) Preferences of VNBs: A VNB expresses its prefer-
ences regarding the choice parameters advertised by SPs:
• SPs’ advertised fee
• SPs’ demand level
In the same manner as the SPs’ case, the value of these
parameters is assigned according to the risk level of each VNB.
The vector corresponding to each preference is presented in
Table IX.
Risk level of bj
Price Preference
of bj
Demand Preference
of bj
Averse ppj = [1, 0, 0] dpj = [1, 0, 0]
Neutral ppj = [1, 1, 0] dpj = [1, 1, 0]
Taker ppj = [1, 1, 1] dpj = [1, 1, 1]
TABLE IX
VNBS’ PREFERENCE VECTORS ACCORDING TO THEIR RISK LEVEL
4) Comparing Preferences and Values: In order to create
the matching preference vectors of each SP and VNB, we
create a matrix for each of their preference parameters. In
the case of the SPs, the ijth matrix element is the result of
multiplying the preference vector of si times the transpose of
the corresponding choice vector of bj , as shown in expressions
(27) and (28), which refer to SPs’ quality and price matrices,
respectively.
Qs(i, j) = qpi × qvTj (27)
Rs(i, j) = ppi × pvTj (28)
For the VNBs, the ijth element of their preference matrices
take into account the preferences of each VNB and the
values assigned to the choice parameters advertised by SPs.
Expressions (29) and (30) correspond to the VNBs’ demand
and price matrices, respectively.
Db(i, j) = dvi × dpTj (29)
Rb(i, j) = pvi × ppTj (30)
5) SPs’ and VNBs’ utility: After defining the preference
vectors, we find it appropriate to calculate the utility stemming
from a matching between si and bj . The idea behind defining
this utility is for the SPs (VNBs) to find a subset of VNBs
(SPs) that would be part of their final preference set. For
this purpose, we propose to define weights that each SP and
VNB can assign to the different parameters that are being
considered, according to how relevant these are for SPs’ and
VNBs’ operations.
Weights are defined as uniformly distributed random num-
bers within a specific range, following expressions (31) and
(32). This definition has been arbitrarily chosen to avoid
increased complexity stemming from different weight distri-
butions.
Wh = U(0.6, 1) (31)
Wl = U(0.1, 0.5) (32)
Given that each SP and VNB takes into account two pa-
rameters for forming their preference vectors, we have a final
set of four different combinations of weights and parameters,
as shown in Table X. The actual fashion in which an SP and
a VNB choose the weight to assign is defined in section III,
where we present our experiment design.
Quality / Demand Price(VNB) / Price(SP)
H H
H L
L H
L L
TABLE X
WEIGHTS ASSIGNED TO SPS’ AND VNBS’ PREFERENCE PARAMETERS
The individual utility of each SP and VNB, i.e., the utility
of a matching between si and bj , is given by (33) and (34),
where wq and wp are the weights assigned by si to the quality
and price factors, and wd and wp are the weights assigned by
bj to the demand and price factors. These expressions show
that the individual utility of SPs and VNBs stems from the sum
of the weighted comparison between choices and preferences.
Us(i, j) = wq ×Qs(i, j) + wp ×Rs(i, j) (33)
Ub(i, j) = wd ×Db(i, j) + wp ×Rb(i, j) (34)
We are also interested in exploring the joint utility associ-
ated with possible matches. To this end, we create a matrix
A, where the ijth element corresponds to the sum of the
individual utilities of si and bj , as defined in (35).
A(i, j) = Us(i, j) + Ub(i, j) (35)
To define the final preference vector of each SP and VNB,
we focus on the joint utility definition given by (35). This
approach permits us to consider a wider range of possibilities
for matching, in addition to allowing us to analyze the mutual
benefit stemming from a partnership instead of individual
gains.
Given our utility calculation method and the value that
weights can take, the maximum joint utility of a match is
4 and the minimum is 0.43. We assume that a SP–VNB pair
3These minimum and maximum values correspond to pairs of SPs and
VNBs that are compatible in at least one factor. We ignore cases in which
utility is 0, as this implies that SPs and VNBs are not compatible at all.
having the minimum utility value should not be included in
each other’s preference vector. In this way, we consider that
there should be a minimum utility threshold (between 0.4
and 4) that represents an acceptable partnership. We define
this threshold as the middle point between the minimum and
maximum possible values. In this particular case, the joint
utility threshold is 1.8.4
The subset of feasible partnerships defines the final prefer-
ence vector of si and bj that will be utilized in the matching al-
gorithm. As pointed out by Roth in [6] regarding the marriage
problem posed by Gale and Shapley, “[p]references can be rep-
resented as rank order lists of the form P (mi) = w3, w2, ...mi
, denoting that man mi’s first choice is w3, his second choice
w2[w3 >mi w2] and so on, until at some point he prefers
to remain unmatched (i.e., matched to himself)”. The same
applies to the problem at hand. In this case, the final preference
vector of si and bj will contain a subset of members of the
opposite set with whom it is possible to form a partnership,
as expressed by (36) and (37). These subsets, or preference
vectors, are sorted in descending order of joint utility value.
P (si) = bk, bl, bm, ..., si (36)
P (bj) = so, sp, sq, ..., bj (37)
D. Algorithm for Matching SPs and VNBs
The matching between SPs and VNBs is implemented
utilizing the deferred acceptance algorithm5 for the many-
to-one matching case. This means that a VNB can form a
partnership with n SPs, where n = VNBs’ quota or partnership
size; while an SP can only form a partnership with one VNB.
The value of n has been set to m, i.e., the total number of
SPs in the network6. This algorithm has been implemented
following its definition presented in [7], [8], [9].
As presented in [6], the outcome of this matching game is a
matching µ : S ∪B → S ∪B such that b = µ(s) if and only if
µ(b) = s. For all s and b, either µ(s) is in B or µ(s) = s; and,
either µ(b) is in S or µ(b) = b. This means that the outcome
matches SPs with VNBs, or to themselves, and if s is matched
to b, then b is matched to s. It is important to note that we
consider the case in which the SPs propose a partnership first,
which leads to an S-optimal matching, µS [6].
Once the matching process is over and we obtain the final
matching µ, each VNB learns about its customers and each SP
learns the ID of the VNB with whom it will be working. These
partnerships further lead to the definition of market demand
as a subset of the initial, geographical demand.
1) Market Demand: The market demand consists of the
throughput needed by the matched SPs to fulfill the traffic
demand of its end users.
4We assume this value to maintain the problem tractability. However further
thresholds that increase/limit the number of possible partnerships can also be
analyzed.
5For a full description of this algorithm, please refer to [6].
6This value was assigned as a means to establish uniformity among the
VNBs in the network and to avoid imposing particular market structures;
however, it can be adjusted to fit scenarios of interest
Let’s refer to the set of SPs matched with bj as MSj =
{ms1j ,ms2j , ...,msnj}. In turn, we can refer to these SPs
as VNB bj’s customers. Each VNB should gather information
about the resource demand of each of its customers and the
maximum price they are willing to pay for these resources7.
Demand includes the quantity (in Mbps) and the type of
resources required. In this model, we assume that SPs can
be divided in two types, regarding the services they offer to
their customers. As such, they may require resources of type
1, utilized to provide video streaming services, or resources
of type 2, required for low throughput, bursty traffic such as
Internet of Things applications. It follows that each VNB bj
creates a demand inventory for each resource type and its goal
is to obtain the same type of resources from the common pool.
III. EXPERIMENT DESIGN
We developed an experiment in order to determine whether
varying the weights assigned by SPs and VNBs to particular
parameters, influences the final matching outcome. For this
purpose, we created four groups corresponding to the possible
weight level combinations (see Table X). Each SP and VNB is
randomly assigned to one experimental group, and thus assigns
the corresponding weights to its utility calculations. Figure 2
illustrates this experiment design.
This experiment permits us to present an additional set of
results and hence determine how different groups of SPs and
VNBs perform in the matching process.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The model and experiments described above have been
developed using MATLAB. We relied on Python, and its
statistical and mathematical packages, for processing and
presentation of the simulation results.
In order to capture a broad overview of the matching
process, we study different scenarios, which take into account
multiple SP and VNB market configurations. In the case
of SPs, we explore settings with 4, 5, 6, 10, 20 and 50
participants. For the VNB market, we consider monopoly,
duopoly and oligopoly (i.e., 3 and 4 VNBs) configurations.
The simulations account for a daily market; hence our
results correspond to aggregate measures from 30 daily inter-
actions × 12 months × 10 repetitions (to account for model
replicability). In each simulation run, we have included a
training period, in order to avoid the influence of the transient
period in the final results.
A. Percentage of Matched SPs and VNBs
Figure 3 shows the percentage of SPs that are matched to a
VNB in the market. These results also represent the percentage
of geographical demand that is converted into market demand,
via the matching process. We observe that as the number of
VNBs increases, a higher percentage of SPs is matched or, a
7Note that there is a difference between the VNB fee and the resource price.
The first is intended to cover the cost incurred by each VNB in obtaining the
resources from the pool, while the latter corresponds to the valuation that
each SP has for the spectrum-related resources.
higher percentage of the geographical demand becomes market
demand.
Fig. 3. Percentage of Matched SPs according to the number of VNBs in the
market
From the VNBs’ perspective, we explore the number of
partners that the middlemen have, in average, according to
their reputation (or quality). Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 show these
results for scenarios with 1, 2, 3 and 4 VNBs, respectively.
These figures show that VNBs with higher reputation partner
with a larger number of SPs.
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Fig. 4. Average number of partners per VNB. Scenario with 1 VNB
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Fig. 5. Average number of partners per VNB. Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Fig. 2. Scheme of the experiment designed for testing the impact of the weight of different SP and VNB matching parameters
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Fig. 6. Average number of partners per VNB. Scenario with 3 VNBs
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Fig. 7. Average number of partners per VNB. Scenario with 4 VNBs
B. Fees that SPs(VNBs) are willing to pay(receive)
As presented in subsection II-C1, SPs and VNBs define
different fees to pay and receive, according to their risk level.
In figure 8, we show the distribution of the real, maximum
fees that each SP is willing to pay for the services of a VNB
i.e., the distribution of SPs’ real valuation of VNB services.
In figure 9, we show the fee that each SP advertises for the
same services. As it can be observed, the distribution of 75%
of advertised the values is lower than that of the real fees.
This is the result of the shading percentage (i.e., fee decrease)
that each SP applies, depending on its own risk profile8.
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Fig. 8. Distribution of real, maximum fees that SPs are willing to pay for
VNB services
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Fig. 9. Distribution of advertised fees that SPs are willing to pay for VNB
services
In the case of VNBs, we differentiate their real and ad-
vertised fees according to their reputation. In this manner,
figures 10 and 11 show that VNBs with higher reputation
levels advertise (or expect) higher fees from their SP partners.
Similarly to the SP case, VNBs’ advertised fees also include
8The results presented in figures 8 and 9 correspond to a scenario with 4
VNBs. The distribution obtained for other VNB market configuration does
not present significant variations.
a level of price shading (i.e., price increase) consistent with
their risk profile9.
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Fig. 10. Distribution of real, maximum fees that VNBs expect to receive
from their SP partners
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Fig. 11. Distribution of advertised fees that VNBs expect to receive from
their SP partners
C. Overall group performance
The experiment defined in section III, aims at exploring
whether the weights assigned to different matching parameters
influence the outcome. In other words, we are interested in
finding out, which experimental group outperforms the rest in
the matching process. For this purpose, we have compared the
percentage of matched SPs, and the number of SP partners
per VNB resulting from each experimental group. Along
these lines, figure 12 shows a swarm plot pointing to the
experimental group with a higher percentage of matched SPs,
for the different SP and VNB market configurations. Similarly,
figure 13, points to the experimental groups with a larger
number of SP partners per VNB for every tested scenario.
9Figures 10 and 11
Fig. 12. Group distribution of matched SPs according to different SP market
configurations
Fig. 13. Group distribution of matched VNBs according to different SP market
configurations
As it can be observed, SPs and VNBs that belong to
experimental group 4 obtain better overall matching results.
This means that participants assigning higher weights to both
parameters are, in average, matched more often (in the SPs
case) and to more partners (from the VNBs’ perspective). Note
that this does not imply that members of other groups are not
matched. This is just a representation of best overall perfor-
mance in all the simulation scenarios that we tested. These
results could also provide VNBs and SPs with information on
how to increase their success opportunities in the matching
process.
V. DISCUSSION
The objective of this work is to present an alternative for
exploring parameters that influence the workings of spectrum
markets. We find that the key for markets to operate well stems
not only from defining appropriate transaction mechanisms
(i.e., auctions), but instead, from providing market participants
with more meaningful ways in which they can express their
requirements and preferences. Adopting a matching markets
approach, permits us to delve into these details and explore
them through a partnership forming process, which is akin
to our interaction with real-world middlemen. This approach
permits SPs and VNBs to determine, a priori, what are their
priorities and restrictions for entering the market.
Existing work on cloud markets [10], [11], [12], points to
the complex process that resource buyers need to follow at
the time of defining their resource needs. By implementing an
approach that relies on a middleman for easing the resource
acquisition process for the SPs, we aim at bridging the
gap between resource needs and availability. We can further
leverage on additional characteristics of VNBs as middlemen,
which can provide us with further advantages. For instance,
looking at the entire model, VNBs can limit the flow of
information between SPs and RPs. This would avoid having
these entities learning (or inferring) each other’s business
models, resource needs and service details. Hence, in the
partnership forming process, SPs have no information on the
owners and type of resources available in the market. In the
resource aggregation stage, VNBs do not communicate any
details regarding their partners. They only need to express their
demand characteristics and the price to pay for resources. As
an additional benefit from VNBs, these entities can fulfill the
demand of SPs that would not be competitive in the market,
otherwise. Hence, our approach would be a method to level the
playing field and lower the entry barriers that new, or small,
participants may face.
Our analysis shows that configurations with a larger number
of VNBs, provide greater opportunities for SPs to access
market resources. This is portrayed in the percentage of
matched SPs. Additionally, we show that our model accurately
captures the difference in performance of VNBs with distinct
reputation. These results follow our real-world intuition, given
that in regular interactions, middlemen (or brokers) with higher
reputation tend to attract a larger number of customers. In a
similar manner, reputation has an effect on the fees that VNBs
expect. These results are consistent with our model and show
the accuracy of its implementation.
This represents the first stage in a larger, more complex,
network model. Indeed, the following stage comprises the
negotiations that VNBs need to carry out in the market to
fulfill their customers’ demand. Starting the process with our
matching approach permits VNBs to handle a known demand,
hence, making their market participation less uncertain. With
time, VNBs can learn from previous market results and adjust
their number of partners, or their demand preferences. It is
important to note that this matching process can be paired with
any existing resource assignment mechanism (e.g., optimiza-
tion processes or auctions). This provides us with the necessary
flexibility to explore the most adequate methods that apply to
the resource definition and environment characteristics.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The current stage of this work elaborates on the settings of a
partnership-forming process between VNBs and SPs. Indeed,
we provide a detailed overview of the factors that we have
taken into account and the role that we envision for them in
a matching process. Additionally, we consider different SP
and VNB market configurations, which allow us to explore
the matching possibilities stemming from these scenarios and,
from a modeling perspective, these allow us to test our model
scalability to more complex settings.
In subsequent publications, we plan on addressing the
resource assignment problem via market mechanisms. This
would permit us to delve into the adequacy of the pricing
levels, the efficiency in resource assignment and the profit
that each entity can obtain from this approach. Additionally,
we are interested in pairing our entire network model with
applicable governance mechanisms. We are particularly inter-
ested in exploring opportunities stemming from polycentric
governance approaches, such as those presented in [13]. This
combination of perspectives may allow us to shed light on pre-
viously unaddressed details behind the development of market
mechanisms suitable for fostering next-generation networks
and technologies.
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